Part Two

Part Two:
The Effects of Television Coverage on
Presidential Decision Making



Most of John Kennedy's successors would look on his situation during the Cuban Missile Crisis with nostalgia and envy. Although it was the gravest crisis of the Cold War, Kennedy had the luxury of operating in what they would probably consider to be the halcyon age before modern television news coverage. That crisis serves as a baseline against which to measure the changes wrought over the next three decades.

Throughout the episode, Kennedy repeatedly benefited from a cocoon of time and privacy afforded by the absence of intensive television scrutiny. The first occasion of this was on October 16, 1962, when the CIA informed him of overhead reconnaissance findings that there were Soviet offensive missiles in Fidel Castro's Cuba. This caused him an enormous political problem. A month earlier he had assured the public that there were no such missiles on the island and that if there were, it would cause a confrontation of the first magnitude with the Soviet Union.

Had this occurred in the environment of the 1990s, one of the U.S. television network's satellites might have discovered the missiles at roughly the same moment the CIA did. The news might have been revealed in an ABC special report that included tape of Kennedy's assurances and pictures of the missiles. On that report and on "Nightline" that evening, angry conservative senators and congressmen would have demanded to know why Kennedy had kept the Soviet outrage a secret from the American people, and called on him to fulfill his pledge by bombing the missile sites immediately. Kennedy would have been faced with almost unbearable congressional and public pressure to order an air strike. We now know from Soviet sources that had he done so, it would almost certainly have led quickly to nuclear war.

Ironically, the presence of U.S. television network satellites might have deterred the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, from slipping the missiles into Cuba. As McNamara said, "When Khrushchev made the decision to introduce the missiles into Cuba, he made it for certain reasons. We can argue whether he was wise or unwise, but he had certain objectives in mind.... He took account of the environment he was operating in. If an element of that environment had been the availability of satellite photographs, he would have changed his program, and he would have behaved in a way that made it unlikely that the satellite photographs available to the press would have disclosed what he was doing. . . .He would have planned his operation differently."The Camera Never Blinks...'the camera never blinks' is supposed to be a slogan for 'it always tells the truth.' Well, it doesn't always tell the truth. . . .If you had a week of silence, with those cameras there and 'no comment,' and statesmen going back and forth. . .I promise you someone in the Congress of the United States would get up and say, 'We do not know. I will issue articles of impeachment. I will find the clause where the president is supposed to report."