3 Michael Mosettig and Henry Griggs, Jr., "TV at the Front," Foreign
Policy, Spring 1980.
4 This was an updating of the 1959 Roper Organization poll.
5 Annenberg Washington Program on Television and the Cuban Missile Crisis,
Washington, D.C., May 31, 1989.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 April 1, 1968, Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson,
1968 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 484.
20 David Halberstam, The Powers That Be (New York: Knopf, 1979), p.
514.
21 Peter Braestrup, Big Story: How the American Press and Television
Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977).
22 Michael Mandelbaum, "Vietnam: The Television War," Daedalus, Fall
1982.
23 See Michael J. Arlen, Living-Room War: Writings About Television
(New York: Viking, 1969).
24 Godfrey Hodgson, America in Our Time (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1976), p. 378.
25 George Bailey, "Television War: Trends in Network Coverage of Vietnam,
1965-1970," Journal of Broadcasting, Spring 1976.
26 Annenberg Washington Program on Television and the Mayaguez Episode,
Beaver Creek, Colorado, July 20, 1990.
27 Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal (New York: Harper & Row, 1979),
p. 278.
28 Annenberg Washington Program on Television and the Mayaguez Episode,
Beaver Creek Colorado, July 20, 1990.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ford opposed the War Powers Act. As he said, "We, I think, have to
recognize that circumstances have changed. Those of us who operated under the
old rules think they were better than what we have to face today. But the big
question is: are you ever going to be able to change it? I have deep, deep
reservations that you will ever get the press to change its method of
operation. I am not optimistic that Congress is going to change its method of
operation. So, I think, when you look at it, when you come to a crisis, our
country is handicapped in how we ought to or could do the best job. . . .I
think the War Powers Resolution ought to be rescinded, but I don't think that's
realistic. Secondly, there ought to be a way to greatly limit the people in
the Congress who will have this highly classified information. Certainly there
ought to be a serious cutback in staffs that are supposed to get the
information, but whether that's feasible until you have a crisis, I don't
know."
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York:
Bantam, 1982), pp. 473-74.
36 Annenberg Washington Program on Television and the Cuban Missile Crisis,
Washington, D.C., May 31, 1989.
37 Mosettig and Griggs, "TV at the Front."
38 Annenberg Washington Program Conference on Television and the Gulf War,
Washington, D.C., September 26, 1991.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid. Wolfowitz cited another advantage: unlike Johnson and Nixon
with the North Vietnamese, Bush did not have to worry about a serious group of
partisans of Iraq within the United States: "There is nobody that I can
identify who ever spoke up for Saddam Hussein. We have always had people speak
up for our enemies, and that invariably clouds the debate even among those who
are agreed about who our enemies are, but argue about means. But in this case,
there was no argument about the nature of Saddam Hussein or the nature of his
aggression."
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Alexander M. Haig, Jr., "TV Can Derail Diplomacy," TV Guide, March
9, 1985.
